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In The Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
LEO PORTER and NORA PORTER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
HYRUM PRICE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Leo Porter and Nora Porter, Plaintiffs, appeal from 
a verdict rendered by a jury in the District Court of 
Weber County, State of Utah. 
The record on appeal is in two volumes, one of which 
consists of the pleadings, minute entries and similar 
papers, all references to this volume are designated by the 
letter "R." The other volume which is separately num-
bered is a transcript of the testimony and proceedings 
at the trial. References to this volume are designated by 
the letter "T." 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 29, 1958, Plaintiff Nora Porter was 
seated in the automobil~ of Plaintiff Leo Porter, while 
said automobile was parked parallel to the west curb of 
Ogden Avenue, in Ogden, Utah, between 35th and 36th 
Streets. Ogden Avenue runs in a north and south direc-
tion. The said automobile was facing south, was station-
ary and was approximately six (6) or eight (8) inches 
from the west curb of Ogden Avenue. (Tr. 15, 20). The 
ti1ne of day was 4 :40 p.m. ( Tr. 7). While in this position 
the automobile of Plaintiff Leo Porter was struck head-
on by an automobile driven by the Defendant, Hyrum 
Price (Tr. 7), causing injuries to Plaintiff Nora Porter, 
who was seated in said automobile, and causing damage 
to the automobile of Leo Porter. 
The defendant, Hyrum Price, was afflicted with dia-
betes and had been so for seventeen (17) years (Tr. 84). 
He is employed at Hill Air Force Base, and resided at 
988-36th Street, which is south and east from the place 
of the accident. On the date of the accident, :\Ir. Price 
was transported from his place of employn1ent to a point 
in West Ogden where he picked up his own automobile 
and then drove east across the 2-!th Street viaduct, which 
is approximately sixteen (16) blocks north of the place 
of the accident. Defendant Price turned south on Lincoln 
Avenue from 2-!th Street and claims to have no recol-
lection of operating his autmnobile frmn that point to the 
point of collision, although he drove fifteen (15) or six-
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teen ( 16) blocks through early evening, heavy traffic, 
along streets regulated by eight (8) Semaphore signals 
that he negotiated successfully. (Tr. ______ ). ~[r. Price ad-
mits to having been afflicted with diabetes for seventeen 
(17) years (Tr. S-!). He has been under the constant care 
of physicians who have attempted to educate him in r2-
gard to the disease and its control. Mr. Price admitted 
to having several insulin reactions during the term of 
the disease and was instructed by his physician to carry 
candy (Tr. 85) with him at all times to curb insulin 
reactions. He has no recollection as to whether or not he 
carried candy with him on the day of the accident (Tr. 
95). 
:Mr. Price's sole defense to the suit of the plaintiffs 
is that he had an insulin reaction that caused him to lose 
consciousness and thus cause the accident. Mr. Price on 
his deposition taken in April, 1959, claimed to have taken 
sixty-five (65) or seventy (70) units of insulin on the 
morning of the accident, and at the time of the trial he 
claimed that he did not remember the exact dosage (Tr. 
86). 
Dr. Drew Petersen, specialist in internal medicine, 
with considerable experience in diagnosing and treating 
diabetic conditions, was defendant's physician and testi-
fied that l\Ir. Price, the defendant, had had a severe in-
sulin reaction that had caused him to lose control of his 
automobile and cause the accident. Dr. Petersen testified 
that one of the causes of an insulin reaction was the tak-
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mg of an excessive dose of insulin ( rrr. 1-!5), and that 
if the defendant took sixty-five ( 65) or seventy (70) units 
of insulin on the day of the accident that this was an ex-
cessive dosage and would cause an insulin reaction (Tr. 
1-!3). l\Ir. Price after the accident was regulated on 
fifty (50) units of insulin and the recommended dosage 
heforP the accident was fifty-five (55) units ( Tr. 162). 
Dr. Petersen stated that most insulin reactions are 
preceded by warning or premonitory symptoms (Tr. 146), 
and that this reaction occurred at the time when it could 
have been expected (Tr. 155). 
Dr. 0. l\L Lewis, specialist in internal medicine, 
with considerable experience in diagnosing and treating 
diabetics, stated that he diagnosed the insulin reaction 
suffered by l\Ir. Price as being caused by the Defendant 
Price taking more insulin than was needed on the day 
in question. (Tr. 120). Dr. Lewis was also of the opinion 
that it was unlikely that the Defendant Price would not 
feel some warning or other premonitory symptoms of the 
corning on of the insulin reaction (Tr. 121), and that this 
insulin reaction suffered by ~Ir. Price occurred at the 
time when it could be expected ( Tr. 1:2:2). 
STATEl\iENT OF POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I. 
THAT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS CONTRARY 
TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF ·THE EVIDENCE. 
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POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
POINT V. 
·THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 10. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS CONTRARY 
TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The evidence preponderantly shows that Mr. Price 
had been a diabetic for seventeen (17) years (Tr. 84) and 
in that time had suffered several insulin reactions which 
if not checked would have caused him to lose conscious-
ness. He knew that he could have such a reaction at any 
time, and that if it happened while driving a motor vehicle 
he would lose control of the vehicle and that probably 
great injury and destruction would result to others. He 
knew that an overdose of insulin would cause such a re-
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action. He adrnitted to taking such an overdose in a depo-
sition taken in April, 1959, although at the time of the 
trial in the month of August, 1959, he thought it more 
discreet to not remember exactly how many units of in-
sulin he had taken on the day of the accident. He knew 
that if he was to have a reaction it would be at about 
this time of the day. Both Dr. Petersen and Dr. Lewis 
testified to this. (Tr. 122, 155). He claimed to have no 
recollection of anything that occurred after he turned 
on to Lincoln A venue fr01n 24th Street, but successfully 
negotiated sixteen ( 16) blocks of heavy evening traffic 
and negotiated eight (8) Semaphore signals and ·was in 
the vicinity of his home when first observed by a friend, 
Mr. Robert Call. (Tr. 7, 13). If the facts are as contended 
by defendant, why didn't he lose control of the car at or 
near the point of losing consciousness, rather than 16 
blocks later. 
This is not a case where unconsciousness is caused by 
a physical disability that the driver has no knowledge 
that he has and hence has no reason to suspect that he 
would become incapacitated while driving and perhaps 
cause injury to others. It is apparent also that it is un-
likely that unconsciousness can1e upon :Jlr. Price without 
some warning or other pren1onitory symptoms. 
Defendant raises the defense that this accident was 
unavoidable. However, the evidence is clear that because 
of the defendant's diabetic condition that he could lose 
consciousness at any time; that an insulin reaction which 
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would bring on unconsciousness most likely would occur 
preceding the evening meal and at the time of day that 
this a<'eident occurred. That an overdose of insulin which 
he admitted taking would cause a reaction and that if he 
did have an insulin reaction while driving a motor ve·· 
hicle that great injury and destruction could occur to 
others and their property, and thus we can only conclude 
that it was negligent of defendant to drive under these 
circumstances, and that if he insisted on driving a motor 
vehicle in his condition that he would have to suffer the 
consequences and bear the responsibility for any injury 
or damage that he caused to others. 
The conclusion seems justified that if the operaor 
of a motor vehicle knew that he was subject to attacks, 
in the course of which he was likely to lose consciousnes8, 
such a loss of consciousness does not constitute a defense 
in an action brought by a person injured as the result 
of the operator's conduct while unconscious. 
In Eleason v. Western Casualty & Surety Co. (1948) 
35 N.W. 2d, 301, it appeared that the driver of a truck 
suffered an epileptic seizure, became unconscious, and 
lost control of the truck, with the result that the vehicle 
struck a workman at the side of the street. It further 
appeared that the driver knew that he was subject to 
spells or seizures rendering him unconscious, although 
he did not know that he had epilepsy. The court held 
that the driver was negligent as a matter of law, since 
under these circumstances the epileptic seizure was not an 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
act of God and the collision was not an unavoidable acci-
dent and in so holding stated: 
"The problem then becomes a question of 
whether it is negligence for a man to drive a car 
when he knows that he is subject to such spells. 
It is considered that, as a matter of la-w, this is 
negligence. The fact that the driver did not know 
the technical name of his malady is not controlling. 
What is important is that he knew that he might be 
unable to control the car which he was driving. 
He also must have known that if he lost control 
of the car there was danger of someone being in-
jured. Driving a car where people are to be met 
with on highways today is dangerous enough if one 
has complete control of his powers. vVhen a 
driver knows that he 1nay become unconscious and 
lose control at any moment, he must be held negli-
gent in attempting to drive." 
See also 28 A.L.R. 2d, page 40, Section 18 and 19. 
A1nerican Juris prudence, Y ol. 5, Page 605, Sec. 179. 
"One who knows he is physically unfit to 
operate an automobile on the highway, as for ex-
ample, that he is subject to attacks of such a char-
acter as ·will prevent his operating an auton1obile 
as a reasonably prudent man would do, and never-
theless undertakes to drive on the highway, should 
be held liable for an injury resulting when he sus-
tains an attack while driving, by reason of which 
he loses control of the car and causes an injury to 
another.'' 
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Criminal liability has been founded upon a person 
allowing himself to fall asleep while operating a motor 
vehicle. Where negligence in the operation of a motor 
vehicle is the operative factor in determining criminal 
responsibility a number of cases have held or recognized 
that an automobile operator unconscious fr01n illness at 
the time of an accident may nevertheless be found guilty 
of a criminal offense under some circumstances. The 
rationale of these cases is that a driver may be guilty 
of criminal negligence in undertaking to drive when he 
knows that he may black out or lose consciousness. 
The Court held in People v. Decina (1956) 2 NY2d 
133, 63 A.L.R. 2d, 970, that where the defendant, knowing 
himself to be subject to epileptic attacks which could 
cause unconsciousness for a considerable time, conscious-
ly undertook to drive on a public highway, suffered an 
attack, and ran at high speed onto the sidewalk, resulting 
in the death of four persons that culpable negligence with-
in the intendment of the statute under which he wa~ 
charged was shown by defendant's electing to drive, know-
ing that he suffered from epilepsy, which would cause 
him to become unconscious. 
In holding sufficient an indictment charging that the 
defendant lost control of his automobile during an epilep-
tic seizure whereby another person was killed, and that 
the defendant had prior knowledge that he was subject 
to epileptic seizures which struck without warning from 
time to time and rendered him unconscious and unfit to 
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operate an autornobile, the court in People v. Eckert, ~ 
NY2d 126, 63 A.L.R. 2d 985, held that the terms "reckless·' 
and "culpably negligent" as used in the statute mean 
son1ething nwre than the slight negligence necessary to 
support a civil action for damages, and connotes conduct 
where the actor has knowledge of the highly dangerom; 
nature of his actions or knowledge of such facts as under 
the circumstances would disclose to a reasonable man 
the dangerous probability of serious bodily harm or death 
under the particular circumstances of the case. The con-
duct of the defendant in driving with the knowledge that 
he was subject to incapacitating seizures was held to 
go beyond the bounds of lack of skill and foresight and 
to demonstrate disregard of and indifference to th~ 
rights of others. 
See also, People v. Freeman, (1943) 142 P.2d 435 
(California.) 
The Utah case of State v. Olsen, (1945) 160 P2d 
427 has a direct bearing on the issue under discussion. In 
this case, the driver, a woman, while driving a truck, felt 
drowsy but continued to drive and fell asleep, losing con-
trol of the truck and the truck ran onto a sidewalk and 
killed a child. The driver was charged with involuntary 
manslaughter and convicted. 
In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
10 
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"*** for while one cannot be liable for what he 
does during the unconsciousness of sleep, he is 
responsible for allowing hi1nself to go to sleep-
to get into a condition where the accident could 
happen without his being aware of it, or able to 
avoid it." 
See also, William v. Frohock, 114 So2 221 (Fla.) 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON UN A VOIDABLE ACCIDENTS. 
"The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. 
An unavoidable accident is one which occurs in 
such a n1anner that it cannot justly be said to 
have been proximately caused by negligence as 
those terms are herein defined. In the event a 
party is danmged by an unavoidable accident he 
has no right to recover since the law requires 
that a person be injured by the fault or negligence 
of another as a prerequisite to any right to re-
cover damages.'' 
The Court will recognize that this instruction haH 
been taken verbatim from the Volume entitled "Jury 
Insrtuctions for Utah," which would seem to give this 
instruction some respectability. The annotation to this 
instruction in "Jury Instructions for Utah" gives as 
supporting authorities Nelson v. Lott, 17 P2 272, a Utah 
case of 1932 which even at the time did not seem to 
be substantial authority for this type of instruction; and 
the California case of Parker v. Womack, 230 P2 823, 
which was overruled as far as it would apply to Utah 
11 
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law by the case of B~digan v. Yellow Cab Company, a 
California Supreme Court decision, found in 320 P2 500 
at 505, which case was decided in 1958 and in so holding 
the California Court stated: 
"We are of the view that the rule applied in 
Parker v. Womack 37 Cal. 2 116, 230 P2 823 
should be reconsidered. In reality the so-called 
defense of unavoidable accidents has no legitimate 
place in our pleading. 
"* * * * * Parker v. Womack is overruled 
insofar as it is inconsistent with the views ex-
pressed herein." 
Plaintiffs contend that the giving of any instruction 
on unavoidable accident was erroneous under the cir-
cumstances of this case. Such an instruction would 
be confusing and misleading and would lead the jury 
to believe that if at the time of the impact the de-
fendant was unconscious and could not control his 
automobile that the accident was unavoidable, and the 
jury would not give proper consideration to the question 
of whether or not it is negligent for the defendant to 
operate a motor vehicle in his physical condition. 
In Butigan v. Yellow Cab Company, 320 P2 500 
cited above held that the giving of an instruction on 
unavoidable accidents was prejudicial and erroneous. 
"In the modern negligence action the plaintiff 
must prove that the injury complained of was 
12 
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proximah·l~· raused h:· the defendant's negligence; 
and the defendant under a general denial may 
show an)· circu1nstances which militates against 
his negligence or its causal effect. The so-called 
defense of inevitable accident is nothing· moi'e 
than a denial by the defendant of negligence or 
a contention that his negligence· if any, was not 
the proxilnate cause of injury. (Cases cited). 
"The statement in the quoted instruction 'un-
avoidable' or 'inevitable accident' that these terms 
·~imply denote an accident that occurred without 
having been proximately caused by negligence' 
informs the jury that the question of unavoid-
ability or inevitability of an accident arises only 
where the plaintiff fails to sustain his burden 
of proving that the defendant's negligence caused 
the accident. Since the ordinary instructions on 
negligence and proxin1ate cause sufficiently show 
that the plaintiff n1ust sustain his burden of proof 
on these issues in order to recover; the instruc-
tion on avoidable accident serves no useful pur-
pose. * * * * *. 
"The instruction is not only unnecessary but 
it is also confusing. When the jurors are told 
that 'in law \Ve recognize what is te-rmed an 
unavoidable or inevitable accident,' they may get 
the impression that unavoidability is an issue to 
be decided, and that if proved, it constitutes a 
separate ground of non-liability ofthe defendant. 
Thus they may be mislead as to the proper man-
ner of determining liability; that is solely on the 
basis of negligence and proxi1nate causation. The 
rules concerning negligence and proximate causa-
tion which must be explained to the jury are in 
themselves complicated and difficult to under-
stand. 
13 
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"A further complication resulting from the 
unnecessary concept of unavoidability or inevi-
tability and its problematic relation to negligence 
and proximate cause can lead only to misunder-
standing • * • • •. 
u The giving of a confusing or mtsleading in-
struction is of course error, and we are of the 
view that in the absence of a special situation 
of the type discussed above ( Californva statute 
cited) the use of an unavoidable accident tnstruc-
tion should be disapproved." (Italic ours.) 
In Carlburg v. Wesley Hospital and Nurse Trairrn'ng 
School (Kansas) 323 P2 638, the Kansas Supreme Court 
upheld the District Court in refusing to give a requested 
instruction on unavoidable accident, stating as follows: 
"Generally speaking· when an accident is 
caused by negligence, there is no room for appli-
cation of the doctrine of 'unavoidable accident' 
even though the accident may have been 'inevit-
able' or 'unavoidable' at the time of its occurrence 
and one is not entitled to the protection of the 
doctrine if his negligence has created, brought 
about or failed to re1nedy a dangerous condition 
resulting in a situation where the accident is 
thus 'inevitable' or 'unavoidable' at the time of 
its occurrence. In other words, a person is liable 
for the combined consequences of an 'inevitable' 
or 'unavoidable' accident and his own negligence. 
"The facts of the accident in the case at bar 
do not bring it u:ithin the doctrine of 'unavoid-
able acciJdent.' The term 'unavoidable accident' 
14 
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excludes and rrpcls ·the idea of ·negligence. It i.-.· 
an occurrcllce 1chich is not contributed· to by the 
JIC!Jli!JCilt act or omission by either party. The 
term is synonomous 1cith (mere accident" or (pure 
accident.' These terms imply that ·the accident 
1cas caused lJ y some unforeseen and unavoidab!e 
event over 1rhich neither party had control. (Ital-
ics ours.) 
In the case Paskil v. Leigh· Rich Corp. 340 P2 7 41 
(California) which was a personal injury action arising 
when plaintiff fell while bowling, the Court stated: 
"Turning now to the specific question 
whether it was error under the facts of this case 
to give the 'unavoidable accident' instruction, the 
following language from Halleck v. Brown, 164 
Cal. Appeal 2 586, 330 P2 852, 854 appears to 
be controlling. (It is well settled that the givtng 
of the unavo~dable accident instruction is pre-
judicial where the evidence discloses no condition 
and no action or conduct apart from the conduct 
of the parties that could reasonably have been 
found sufficient. to aquit them of negligence." 
(Italics ours.) 
See also Tomchik v. Julian (California) 340 P2 72. 
Plaintiffs contend that the giving of the instruction 
objected to gave to the defendant an unfair advantage 
and one that he was not entitled to, and that it served 
only to confuse and mislead the jury and was preju-
dicial to the rights of the plaintiffs. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
Plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 5 reads as 
follows: 
"If the defendant, Hyrum Price, knew that 
because of his diabetic condition he was subject 
to attacks in the course of which he was likely 
to lose consciousness but nevertheless operated a 
motor vehicle on a public highway and while in 
a state of unconsciousness caused by his diabetic 
condition, drove his automobile onto the wrong 
side of the road and into the automobile in which 
Plaintiff K ora Porter was seated, causing damage 
to the motor vehicle owned by Leo Porter and 
injury to Nora Porter, you will find the Defend-
ant, Hyrum Price, was negligent in causing the 
said collision and will award judgment to the 
plaintiffs for such damages and injuries as you 
find were caused by and are the proximate re-
sult of defendant's negligence." 
The evidence showed that the Defendant, :Mr. Price, 
had been under the care of various physicians for seven-
teen (17) years for the treatment of diabetes, and that 
during that time he had had several insulin reactions; 
and that he was well aware that he could have an 
insulin reaction at any time which would cause him to 
lose consciousness unless he was able to arrest the re-
action. Both the physicians testified that these insulin 
reactions could occur without warning although this was 
improbable. Under these circumstances, the driver who 
16 
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loses t•on~eiou::-;np::-;:-; and thereby loses control of his 
automobile is' nPgligent as a matter of hn\" and ,the aho\~e 
instrudion should have been submitted' to th~ jury. 
'. 
American J uri~prudenee, Y olume 5, page 605, sec-
tion 179; 
:2~ A.L.R. 2d, page 40; section 18' 
Eleason Y. \Yestern Casualty & Surety Co., 35 NvV2 
page 301; 
See also State v. Olson (Utah) 160 P2 ±27. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO .. 9. 
The requested instruction reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that it is the duty of a 
person who operates a motor vehicle upon the 
public highways to maintain himself in such a 
physical condition that he can operate the said 
motor vehicle in such a manner as an ordiliary 
prudent man could do, and he is responsible 
for any damage or ~njury he causes to. the prop~ 
erty or persons of others if he allows himself to 
get into a condition where an accident could 
happen without his being aware of it or ·able 
to avoid it, and if you find that defendant s_uf-
fered from diabetes, and in any manner, did not 
properly care for himself so as to allow himself 
to get into a physical condition where he could 
lose control of his automobile while operating 
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said automobile upon public highway, you will 
find the defendant negligent if you find that 
defendant did in fact lost control of his auto-
mobile because he failed to maintain himself in 
proper physical condition." 
Testimony of defendant in his deposition taken in 
April 1959 was that on the day in question he had in-
jected himseLf with either sixty-five ( 65) or seventy 
(70) units of insulin. He did not remember which. The 
testimony of his physician was that he had prescribed 
that l\ir. Price, the defendant, take only fifty-five (55) 
units at that time, and that either sixty-five (65) or 
seventy (70) units would be an overdose and would 
cause such a reaction as defendant claims to have had 
and would cause unconsciousness. In taking the overdose 
of insulin, defendant failed to properly maintain himself 
in a proper physical condition, knowing that if the sugar 
content in his blood was out of balance that he would 
lose consciousness, and if this occurred while driving 
his car that he would lose control of the car with the 
possibility that he would injure someone who was in his 
line of travel. 
This would appear to be a stronger case against 
the defendant than was found in the case of State v. 
Olsen (Utah) 160 P2 427 where the driver of a truck 
was found guilty of criminal negligence and convicted 
of involuntary manslaughter when she fell asleep while 
driving, ran up on a sidewalk and killed a child. 
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POINT V. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 'TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 10. · 
The requested instruction reads as follows : 
"You are instructed that in determining 
\\'hether or not defendant was guilty of negligence 
and colliding with the automobile of Leo Porter 
on the day and at the time in question, you may 
take into consideration that he was afflicted with 
a disease known as diabetes, as a result of which 
he was subject to attacks which could occur with 
or without warning to defendant, and that such 
attacks were of such a character as would pre-
vent his operating an automobile as an ordinary, 
prudent man would do." 
The evidence has clearly shown that the defendant 
was suffering with a disease known as diabetes and had 
been so afflicted for the past seventeen (17) years. That 
during that time he had suffered several insulin re-. 
actions, and the evidence also shows that the cause 9f 
his losing consciousness on the day in question, if he 
did so, was an insulin reaction. It is the contention of 
the defendant that such a reaction came on without 
warning. 
In the ease of Williams v. Fro"hock (Florida) 114 
So:2, 221, the defendant while driving in downtown 11:ianri' 
(Florida) in the day time suffered a sudden illness in 
which he "blacked out." His car went out of control, 
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leaped the curb, and injured the plaintiff who was a 
pedestrian on the sidewalk. The defendant had suffered 
loss of consciousness several times before but never 
while driving. His physician had not diagnosed his 
condition as one furnishing a propensity for repetition 
and had never told him not to drive. On a jury verdict, 
the defendant was found to be negligent in causing 
the accident, and judgment was rendered for plaintiff 
for Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) and No/100 Dollars 
compensatory damages. Plaintiff, the prevailing party, 
appealed because the Court excused the defendant for 
gross negligence and withdrew from the jury the con-
sideration of punitive damages. 
Insofar as the decision of the District Court of 
Appeals of Florida relates to the issue of defendant's 
negligence, it affirmed the verdict and stated: 
"It is the law of this state as recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Bridges v. Speer, 79 So2 
679, 681 'that where one has notice or knowledge 
of the existence of a physical impairment which 
may c01ne on suddenly and destroy his power to 
control an automobile, it is negligence to an ex-
treme degree for such persons to operate his 
vehicle.' (Italics Ours.) 
"Ordinarily the fact that a person has one 
or more sick fainting spells over a period of 
years could well be considered enough to put 
such a party on notice that it could and might 
happen again at any time such as while driving 
an automobile." 
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It is to be noted that in the case cited above al-
though the Court found that defendant's medical history 
was not such as to necessarjly give him a "premonition 
or warning of his condition,'' it affirmed the finding 
of negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs contend that it is immaterial whether 
defendant experienced any premonitory symptoms prior 
to losing consciousness. If he had warning symptoms 
and did not heed them, he was negligent. He had know~ 
ledge that it was a reasonably foreseeable possibility 
that he could have an insulin reaction at any time and 
lose consciousness. Knowing that such was the case, it 
is only just that the responsibility for the accident 
should rest squarely upon the defendant, and that 
plaintiffs should not be completely helpless and without 
remedy. Add to this, the fact that defendant induced 
the severe insulin reaction by a greatly excessive in-
jection of insulin, and it must be concluded that this 
accident was a result of defendants negligence and not 
unavoidable. If the defendant lost consciousness sixteen 
(16) blocks north of the point of the accident, a reason-
able person may well ask, "If the facts are as stated 
by the defendant, why did he not lose control of his 
automobile at or near the point of losing consciousness 
rather than safely negotiating his automobile through 
si.:deen (16) blocks of heavy evening traffic, negotiating 
successfully eight (8) semaphore signals and various stop 
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signs, and losing control of ?is automobile in the near 
vicinity of his home f' 
The only fair conclusion to arrive at is that the 
defendant did have warning or knowledge that he was 
suffering or about to suffer an insulin reaction which, 
if left unchecked, would cause him to lose consciousness, 
but that he was attempting to get home in order to 
treat himself, and in thus taking a long-shot chance 
took other people's lives in his hands. 
The verdict of the jury must be reversed and the 
cause remanded solely for the purpose of determining 
plaintiffs' damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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